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Abstract
Objective To determine the prevalence of financial conflicts of interest
among members of panels producing clinical practice guidelines on
screening, treatment, or both for hyperlipidaemia or diabetes.
Design Cross sectional study.
Setting Relevant guidelines published by national organisations in the
United States and Canada between 2000 and 2010.
Participants Members of guideline panels.
Main outcome measures Prevalence of financial conflicts of interest
among members of guideline panels and chairs of panels.
Results Fourteen guidelines met our search criteria, of which five had
no accompanying declaration of conflicts of interest by panel members.
288 panel members had participated in the guideline development
process. Among the 288 panel members, 138 (48%) reported conflicts
of interest at the time of the publication of the guideline and 150 (52%)
either stated that they had no such conflicts or did not have an
opportunity to declare any. Among 73 panellists who formally declared
no conflicts, 8 (11%) were found to have one or more. Twelve of the 14
guideline panels evaluated identified chairs, among whom six had
financial conflicts of interest. Overall, 150 (52%) panel members had
conflicts, of which 138 were declared and 12 were undeclared. Panel
members from government sponsored guidelines were less likely to
have conflicts of interest compared with guidelines sponsored by
non-government sources (15/92 (16%) v 135/196 (69%); P<0.001).
Conclusions The prevalence of financial conflicts of interest and their
under-reporting by members of panels producing clinical practice
guidelines on hyperlipidaemia or diabetes was high, and a relatively high
proportion of guidelines did not have public disclosure of conflicts of
interest. Organisations that produce guidelines should minimise conflicts
of interest among panel members to ensure the credibility and evidence
based nature of the guidelines' content.
Introduction
The prevalence of financial conflicts of interest (COI) between
clinicians and industry has been a topic of concern for the
medical profession for more than two decades. The influence
of COI on medical research and publishing has had recent
attention,
1-5 and the latest revelations about frequent and large
“consultancy” payments to physicians, the practice of “ghost
writing” by drug company employees, and the prevalence of
industryfunded“keyopinionleaders”inmedicineraiseconcern
thatphysicians’financialrelationswithindustrymayundermine
thepracticeandpromotionofhighqualityevidencebasedcare.
6-9
One area in which the presence of COI may be particularly
concerning is the development of clinical practice guidelines.
10
Guidelines serve to standardise care, to inform evidence based
practice, and ultimately to protect patients, so their freedom
frombiasisparticularlyimportant.
11Overthepastdecade,most
organisations that produce guidelines have adopted COI
disclosure policies for members of guideline panels. Some
organisations, such as the UK National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence (NICE), have gone further, excluding
authors with COI from relevant decision making.
12 In contrast
to guidelines from centralised organisations such as NICE, US
and Canadian guidelines are issued by medical specialty
societies, non-profit organisations, government agencies, and
professional associations, each with their own guideline
development processes and COI disclosure policies.
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RESEARCHAlthoughmostorganisationsmandatesomeformofdisclosure,
complete transparency is often not achieved,
13 14 and simple
disclosureofCOImaynotbeenoughtopreventpanelmembers’
bias from influencing recommendations.
11 15 16 Emphasising the
importance of having unbiased recommendations to guide
clinical practice, the Institute of Medicine recently published
recommendations on management of COI among authors of
clinical practice guidelines.
17 These recommendations call for
the exclusion of panel members with financial COI, the
appointmentofachairwithoutCOI,andanendtodirectfunding
of guidelines by industry. They also recommend full disclosure
of the COI policy of each guideline panel, along with the
potential COI of all panel members. Lastly, they recommend
that if appointing panellists with COI is unavoidable, their
presence should be limited to a minority and they should be
prohibited from voting.
Using the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations as a
framework, we determined the prevalence of financial COI
amongguidelinepanellistsfromorganisationsconsideredlikely
to reflect best clinical practice and influence behaviour. We
evaluated guidelines produced over the past decade by national
organisations in the United States and Canada that covered
screening for and treatment of diabetes and hyperlipidaemia.
We hypothesised that a substantial proportion of members of
guideline panels would have COI. We chose hyperlipidaemia
and diabetes as representative disease categories because of the
high prevalence of both diseases in the population. In addition,
the drugs used to treat these diseases account for the largest
shareofprescriptiondrugexpenditureswithintheUSMedicare
population and some of the highest spending on prescription
drugs worldwide.
18
Methods
Wedidacrosssectionalstudytoexaminetheextentoffinancial
COI among members of guideline panels who participated in
thedevelopmentofguidelinesonhyperlipidaemiaanddiabetes
between 2000 and 2010.
Sample
We identified guidelines by searching the National Guideline
Clearinghouse, MDConsult, UpToDate, and the websites of
organisations with a potential interest in hyperlipidaemia and
diabetes(suchastheAmericanDiabetesAssociation,American
Heart Association, and American College of Physicians). We
used the search terms “hyperlipidemia,” “cholesterol,” and
“diabetes” to identify potential guidelines. We selected
guidelines if they were issued by national organisations
(governmentsponsored,medicalspecialtysocieties,professional
associations, and non-profit organisations) in North America
(UnitedStatesandCanada),between2000and2010andcovered
screening, treatment, or both for hyperlipidaemia or diabetes in
the general population. We classified each organisation exactly
as listed on the National Guidelines Clearinghouse website,
exceptfortheCanadianDiabetesAssociationandtheCanadian
Cardiovascular Association, which were not included on this
website.WeusedthedesignationsoftheUSorganisationsmost
similar to them—the American Diabetes Association and the
AmericanHeartAssociation.Weexcludedguidelinesaffiliated
toaUSstateorCanadianprovinceandthosecoveringscreening
and management for particular subgroups of disease (for
example, management of diabetes in patients with HIV) (table
1⇓). We determined industry sponsorship of a guideline from
acknowledgments in the guideline itself. The web appendix
gives references for all the guidelines included.
Main outcome measure
We defined financial COI as the direct compensation of a
guideline panellist by a manufacturer of a drug used to treat the
disease of interest in the guideline, in the form of grants
(including research), speakers’ fees, honorariums,
consultant/adviser/employeerelationships,andstockownership.
We classified COI into three categories: declared in the
guideline; undeclared in the guideline but identified through
our search strategy; and no opportunity to declare COI in the
guideline but identified COI by our search strategy.
Identification of COI
WesearchedeachguidelinefordeclarationofCOIbythepanel
members. If no conflict was declared in the guideline or in an
accompanying document, we searched Medline to identify
financial COI. We searched all publications of each panel
member in the two years before publication and the year of
publicationoftheguidelinefordataonCOI.Weusedtwoyears
as the cut-off because organisations vary in the length of time
they consider COI to be relevant. NICE considers COI to be
relevant 12 months before participation on a committee,
19
whereas the World Health Organization considers COI to be
relevant within four years of participation.
20
If the Medline search identified no COI, we used Google to
search the internet, combining each panellist’s name with the
name of each of the major manufacturers that develop and
market drugs for hyperlipidaemia and diabetes. We searched
for any relevant relations that occurred in the two years before
release of the guideline. We identified drug companies by
searching the Tarascon Pocket Pharmacopoeia 2010 edition
for all drugs listed for the treatment of hyperlipidaemia and
diabetesandidentifyingtheirmanufacturerbyaninternetsearch.
We reviewed the first 50 search results for each panellist-drug
company pair for reported financial relations with the drug
industry. We chose a threshold of 50 results because search
results became less relevant after this threshold. When we
identified COI, we confirmed the identity of the panel member
ofinterestbymatchinghisorherreportedinstitutionalaffiliation
with the one documented in the guideline. One author (JN)
identified COI, and another (SK) verified the presence of COI.
Statistical analysis
We report the percentage of panel members with financial COI
andwhetherthechairofthepanelhadCOI.Wereportthetypes
of compensation received by panellists but distinguish grant
funding from other types of compensation, as it presumably is
intended to support research efforts whereas other forms of
compensationgenerallysupportpersonalincome.Inasecondary
analysis, we dichotomised guidelines into several categories,
including sponsorship (government versus other), disease
(hyperlipidaemiaversusdiabetes),andcountryoforigin(United
States versus Canada). We created these categories to examine
the effect of the characteristics of the organisation sponsoring
theguidelinesontheprevalenceofreportedCOI.Wecompared
the proportion of COI in each guideline category overall and in
a secondary sensitivity analysis, limiting the sample to
guidelineswithdeclarationsofCOItoaccountforpossiblebias
related to opportunity for disclosure. We examined differences
between each category by using a two sided, 0.05 level χ
2 test
of significance. We used Stata statistical software for all
statistical analyses.
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Characteristics of guidelines
We identified 14 guidelines that met our search criteria: seven
for diabetes and seven for hyperlipidaemia (table 1⇓). Four of
the guidelines were published by medical specialty societies,
two were from professional associations, six were from
government sponsored organisations, and two were published
byprivatenon-profitorganisations.Threeguidelineswerefrom
Canadaand11fromtheUnitedStates.Twoguidelineproducing
organisations had drug industry sponsorship (one from Canada
and one from the United States). Among the 14 guideline
producing organisations, nine provided a document listing the
COIofpanellists.Fiveguidelinesdidnotprovideanopportunity
forpanelliststopubliclydeclarefinancialCOI,andfourofthese
were sponsored by the government.
Panel size
The size of panels ranged from nine to 93, with a median size
of 15 panellists per guideline. A total of 288 panel members,
representing 265 different people, participated in the 14
guidelines. Twenty-three panel members participated in two
guidelines. Of these panel members, five had COI that were
counted for both guidelines, two had COI that counted for only
one of the guidelines, and 16 had no COI. Among the 23
panellists who were counted twice, 17 had no opportunity to
publicly declare COI.
Prevalence of financial COI
Of the 288 panel members (chairs included), 48% (n=138)
reported COI at the time of the publication of the guideline and
52% (150) either stated that they had no COI (73) or did not
have an opportunity to declare COI (77) (table 1⇓). Of those
who declared conflicts, 93% (128) reported receiving
honorariums, speakers’ fees, employee/adviser/consultancy
payments, or stock ownership from drug manufacturers of
interest. The remaining 7% (10) reported receiving funding
exclusively for research.
Ofthe211panellistswhohadanopportunitytopubliclydeclare
COI, 73 stated that they had no COI, among whom 11% (n=8)
had undeclared COI identified through our search strategy (fig
1⇓).All73panelmembersreceivedspeakers’fees,honorariums,
or employee/adviser/consultancy payments or held stock
ownership. Among the 77 panel members who did not have an
opportunity to publicly declare COI, we found 5% (4) to have
COI through our search strategy (fig 1⇓). Of the 12 undeclared
COI,wefoundonethroughourGooglesearchandtheremainder
through our Medline search. In summary, among 288 members
of guideline panels, 52% (n=150) had COI, of which 138 were
declared and 12 undeclared. Four undeclared conflicts were
among panel members of guidelines without an opportunity to
declare COI.
Ofthe14guidelines,12identifiedachair.Ofthese12,wefound
six to have COI, all of which were declared. Among guidelines
that provided public declarations of COI, six of seven chairs
reported COI (table 1⇓).
Conflicts of interest by guidelines’
characteristics
COI were significantly less common among guideline panels
sponsored by the government than among panels sponsored by
otherorganisations(16%v69%;P<0.001)(table2⇓).COIwere
highly prevalent among panel members of guidelines produced
by Canadian specialty societies and US specialty societies but
were significantly higher among Canadian panels (83% v 58%;
P<0.001).Wefoundnostatisticallysignificantdifferenceinthe
prevalenceofCOIamongpanelmembersofdiabetescompared
with hyperlipidaemia guidelines (56% v 44%; P=0.06). In a
sensitivity analysis limited to guidelines for which panellists
had the opportunity to publicly declare conflicts, we found that
COIwerestillsignificantlylesscommonamongguidelinepanels
sponsored by the government compared with panels sponsored
by other organisations (46% v 72%; P=0.01) (table 2⇓). COI
were significantly more common among Canadian than US
panels(83%v68%;P=0.04),andagainwefoundnostatistically
significant difference in the prevalence of COI among panel
membersofdiabetescomparedwithhyperlipidaemiaguidelines
(table 2⇓).
Discussion
For diabetes and hyperlipidaemia, we found that conflicts of
interest (COI) were present for the vast majority of guideline
panels reviewed. We also found that among panels that had
chairs,halfofthesehadCOI.Inaddition,amongpanellistswith
an opportunity to publicly report COI, one out of nine reported
no COI but were found to have undeclared COI. Our data
illustratethepervasivenessofCOIamongmembersofguideline
panels and may raise questions about the independence and
objectivity of the guideline development process in the United
States and Canada.
A recent study of COI for members of cardiovascular guideline
panelsalsofoundthatCOIwerecommon.
21However,thisstudy
was limited to guidelines produced by the American College
of Cardiology/American Heart Association, an organisation
whose guideline development process has previously been
scrutinised for influence by industry.
22 Our study includes a
wide range of guideline producing organisations and can be
applied to the general guideline development process in the
United States and Canada. Furthermore, our study exposes the
problem of incomplete disclosure and highlights the important
relationbetweensponsorshipofguidelinesandpresenceofCOI.
Our results are similar to those of a study done more than a
decade ago, which found that 59% of authors of guidelines
admittedtohavingreceivedfundingfrommanufacturerswhose
productswereincludedorconsideredintheguideline.However,
only two of 44 guidelines studied at that time had publicly
availabledisclosuredocuments,andCOIweredocumentedonly
throughselfreport.
23Ourstudyshowsthatinspiteofincreasing
requirements for disclosure of COI by guideline panellists the
rate of COI remains similar, suggesting that mandating
transparencymaynottranslateintodecreasedCOIonguideline
panels.
Among guideline sponsoring organisations with public
disclosure of COI, we found that government sponsored panels
had significantly fewer panel members with COI, suggesting
thatexpertpanelscanbeconvenedfrommemberspredominantly
without COI. However, although our sample included six
government sponsored guidelines, only two of them (one
Canadian and one US) included a public statement on the COI
of panel members. The remaining four were produced by the
Veterans Administration and the US Preventive Services Task
Force (USPSTF). The USPSTF is the main government
sponsored body in the United States that issues guidelines on
screening and has a strict policy of managing its members’
conflictsofinterest.
24However,taskforcepanelmembers’COI
disclosurescanbeviewedonlyafterarequestundertheFreedom
of Information Act is filed with the government. This process
is unnecessarily cumbersome and does not lend itself to easy
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the Veterans Administration does not disclose its panel
members’ COI. In contrast to the USPSTF, the Veterans
Administration presents no apparent official policy on the
management of COI among panel members. This is in contrast
to NICE, which provides detailed policies and procedures on
disclosureaswellasCOIdeclarationsonitswebsite.
16Although
this lack of full transparency by government sponsored panels
intheUnitedStatesistroubling,oursearchidentifiedonlythree
members of USPSTF and Veterans Administration guideline
panels with undeclared financial COI, suggesting that COI are
managed well on government sponsored panels.
In contrast to government sponsored panels, we found that COI
were very common among panel members for guidelines
produced by specialty societies. Guidelines produced by
non-government sponsored organisations have been shown to
be of poor methodological quality
25; however, they contribute
substantially to the guideline pool in the United States and
Canada, with specialty societies alone accounting for almost
40% of guidelines in the National Guideline Clearinghouse.
17
Furthermore, several of the specialty societies included in our
reviewhaveinternationalprominenceoutsideofNorthAmerica,
and their guidelines may have broad international influence.
ThehighprevalenceofCOIamongpanelmembersofguidelines
sponsoredbyspecialtysocietiescombinedwiththelessrigorous
development process may adversely affect the independence
and the evidence base of the recommendations issued.
26
Limitations
Our study has several strengths and limitations that deserve
comment. Five panel members’ conflicts were counted twice
because our reporting of COI was based on panel membership
and was not limited to unique individuals. If we had reported
COIonthebasisofthe265uniqueindividualswhoparticipated
in the process, our declared COI rate would have been 50%
(n=133). This alternative analysis would not change the
implications of our findings. We compared the prevalence of
COI among government sponsored guidelines with that of
non-government sponsored guidelines, and many government
sponsored guidelines did not have accompanying declarations
of COI. However, to identify potential conflicts we did a
comprehensive Medline and Google search for each panel
member. In addition, to account for potential bias related to
opportunity for disclosure, we did a sensitivity analysis and
limited the sample to guidelines with disclosed COI. This
analysis confirmed our finding that COI were less prevalent
among guidelines sponsored by the government.
We also note that our methods were deliberately conservative
and may have underestimated COI among guideline panellists.
We considered a financial conflict of interest to be present only
when clear documentation of compensation of the panellist by
a manufacturer of a product mentioned in a guideline was
present. For the two guidelines in our study that were directly
sponsoredbydrugcompanies,wesearchedeachpanelmember
individually for COI, rather than assuming they had received
compensation for their work on the guideline. We also found
that many members of guideline panels were authors of papers
reporting on industry sponsored clinical trials or had chaired
industry sponsored conferences. We did not count these
relationships as financial conflicts; however, these panel
membersprobablyreceivedfundingfromindustry.Wealsodid
not include financial conflicts that did not relate directly to a
guideline’s content or that did not directly involve the panel
member of concern. For example, if a panel member’s spouse
was an employee of the drug industry, we did not consider it a
conflict. We were also unable to account for relationships with
industry that were not publicly available and did not search for
additional conflicts if one was already declared. Both of these
factors probably limited the number and scope of COI found in
our study.
Finally, our sample size was limited to only two disease
conditions. However, together, these two conditions are
predicted to be among the top five drug treatment categories in
the world by 2015, with combined consumer spending of up to
$82bn (£52bn; €59bn).
27 Furthermore, our results are more
generalisable than are those of other recent studies of its kind.
In contrast to the recent paper by Mendelson et al,
21 which
focused on one guideline producing organisation, our study
sample included guidelines from many different organisations,
which provides a more realistic estimate of the prevalence of
COI on guideline panels.
Conclusions
The finding that most current members of guideline panels and
half of chairs of panels have COI is concerning and suggests
that a risk of considerable influence of industry on guideline
recommendations exists. The Institute of Medicine recently
recommended that guideline panels should be as conflict-free
as possible,
17 The minimisation of COI on guideline panels is
likelytodofarmoretomitigatebiasthanwouldmeredisclosure.
The guideline development process needs to be reformed to
minimise conflicts of interest among panel members to ensure
thecredibilityandevidencebasednatureoftheclinicalpractice
guidelines issued in the United States and Canada. The limited
COI we identified among panel members who participated in
developing government sponsored guidelines suggests that
expert panels without many COI can be convened. Future
research should examine whether the presence of COI
diminishes in the light of the international trend, articulated by
the Institute of Medicine, towards both transparency and
exclusion of panel members with COI. Conflict-free guideline
panels are feasible and would help to improve the quality of the
guideline development process.
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Table 1| Clinical practice guidelines for diabetes and hyperlipidaemia: panel members’ conflicts of interest (COI)*. Values are numbers
(percentages) unless stated otherwise
Total conflicts
Conflicts
identified by
search
Declared
conflicts
Chair with
conflicts?
COI
declaration
publicly
available?
No of panel
members
Organisation
type† Year issued Guideline
Diabetes:
0 0 Unknown No No 23 Government 2003 VA/DoD clinical practice
guideline
3 (20) 2 (13) 1 (7) Yes Yes 15 Government 2005 Canadian Task Force on
Preventive Health Care‡
10 (83) 1 (8) 9 (75) Yes Yes 12 Medical specialty
society
2007 American Association of
Clinical Endocrinologists
73 (78) 1 (1) 72 (77) Yes Yes 93 Professional
association
2008 Canadian Diabetes
Association‡§
1 (6) 1 (6) Unknown No No 16 Government 2008 US Preventive Services
Task Force
6 (40) 0 6 (40) Yes Yes 15 Non-profit 2010 Institute for Clinical
Systems Improvement
13 (87) 0 (0) 13 (87) NA Yes 15 Professional
association
2010 American Diabetes
Association
106 (56) 5 (3) 101 (53) 189 Total
Hyperlipidaemia:
1 (11) 1 (11) Unknown No No 9 Medical specialty
society
2002 American Association of
Clinical Endocrinologists¶
8 (89) 0 8 (89) Yes Yes 9 Government 2004 Expert Panel on
Detection, Evaluation, and
Treatment of High Blood
Cholesterol in Adults
7 (41) 0 7 (41) Yes Yes 17 Medical specialty
society
2005 American Heart
Association**
1 (7) 1 (7) Unknown No No 13 Government 2006 VA/DoD clinical practice
guideline
2 (13) 1 (6) 1 (6)†† No No 16 Government 2008 US Preventive Services
Task Force
23 (100) 3 (13) 20 (87) NA Yes 23 Medical specialty
society
2009 Canadian Cardiovascular
Society‡
2 (17) 1 (8) 1 (8) No Yes 12 Non-profit 2009 Institute for Clinical
Systems Improvement
44 (44) 7 (7) 37 (37) 99 Total
150 (52) 12 (4) 138 (48) 288 Overall total
NA=no panel chair identified; VA/DoD=Veterans Administration/Department of Defense.
*Defined as direct compensation of guideline author by drug company in form of grants, speakers’ fees, honorariums, consultant/adviser/employee compensation,
and stock ownership 2 years before and including year of guideline release.
†Classified exactly as listed on National Guidelines Clearinghouse website, except for Canadian Diabetes Association and Canadian Cardiovascular Association,
which were not included on website; designations of US organisations most similar to them used—American Diabetes Association and American Heart Association.
‡Canadian guidelines.
§Drug company sponsors included GlaxoSmithKline, Novo, Sanofi, Servier Canada, Astra Zeneca, Bayer, Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer, and Hoffman-LaRoche, although
document states that none of the authors was compensated in any way.
¶Drug company sponsors included Abbott Laboratories, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, KOS Pharmaceuticals, Merck, Parke-Davis Pharmaceuticals, and Sankyo
Parke-Davis.
**Other sponsoring organisations included councils on cardiovascular nursing, arteriosclerosis, thrombosis, vascular biology, basic cardiovascular sciences,
cardiovascular disease in the young, clinical cardiology epidemiology and prevention, nutrition, physical activity and metabolism, and stroke and Preventive
Cardiovascular Nurses Association.
††No official COI document in guideline, but one author was noted to have been excused from voting because of his employment at Merck Pharmaceuticals.
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RESEARCHTable 2| Reported financial conflicts of interest (COI) among panel members by category of guideline sponsor
Guidelines with declared COI All guidelines
Characteristic of
guideline P value*
No (%) panel
members with COI
No of panel
members
No of
guidelines P value
No (%) panel
members with COI
No of panel
members
No of
guidelines
0.52 105 (70) 150 5 0.06 106 (56) 189 7 Diabetes
40 (66) 61 4 44 (44) 99 7 Hyperlipidaemia
0.01 11 (46) 24 2 <0.001 15 (16) 92 6 Government
134 (72) 187 7 135 (69) 196 8 Other*
0.04 30 (68) 44 3 <0.001 31 (58) 53 4 US specialty†
96 (83) 116 2 96 (83) 116 2 Canadian specialty
*All non-government sponsored guidelines included in this category.
†Includes organisations designated as “medical specialty” or “professional associations” on National Guidelines Clearinghouse website.
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Panellists with no declaration of conflicts of interest (COI) (n=150)
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